Thinking for Oneself and Obeying the Commands of Duty: Resolving an Apparent Tension in Kantian Ethics

Abstract

Kant’s moral philosophy appears to generate a tension between two central commitments: the demand that individuals “think for themselves” and act according to their own principles, and the requirement that they act in accordance with moral duties. This paper examines whether this tension constitutes a genuine contradiction. First, it identifies the apparent conflict between intellectual autonomy and obedience to duty. Second, it develops an argument that reconciles these commitments by interpreting duty as an expression of rational self-legislation. Third, it evaluates whether this reconciliation is vulnerable to refutation. Finally, it assesses whether the contradiction is real or merely apparent. The paper concludes that the tension arises from a misunderstanding of autonomy as independence from law rather than as self-legislation, and therefore does not undermine Kantian ethics.

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